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THE TEAMSTER JOINT GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE AND
NLRB DEFERRAL POLICY: A FAILURE TO PROTECT
THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE'S STATUTORY RIGHTS
GREGORY E. ZIMMERMANt
A Teamster driver, exhausted after several days of long hauls,
concerned with her safety, and cognizant of Department of Transporta-
tion regulations that prohibit a carrier from requiring an employee to
drive while dangerously ill or fatigued,' refuses a work assignment.2
The driver is subsequently discharged and files a grievance' under the
applicable Teamster collective bargaining agreement.4 She charges both
that her dismissal violated the contract5 and that her dismissal was the
t B.A., Dickinson College, 1983; J.D. Candidate 1986, University of Pennsylva-
nia. The author wrote this Comment while a student at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
1 The Department of Transportation regulation states that
[n]o driver shall operate a motor vehicle, and a motor carrier shall not
require or permit a driver to operate a motor vehicle, while the driver's
ability or alertness is so impaired, or so likely to become impaired,
through fatigue, illness, or any other cause, as to make it unsafe for him to
begin or continue to operate the motor vehicle.
49 C.F.R. § 392.3 (1983).
2 The hypothetical situation presented is loosely based on Finn v. Yellow Freight
Sys., No. 83-1769 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 1984). See Brief of Appellant at 3-6, Finn v.
Yellow Freight Sys., No. 83-1769 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 1984).
' The grievance process provides a forum for resolution of disputes arising over
the implementation of the collective bargaining agreement in existence between a union
and an employer. As Professor Robert Gorman notes:
Complaints of contract breach . . . are typically brought, by the union or
the individual grievant, to a low-level supervisor in the first instance, and
if unresolved to higher levels of supervision. If the dispute remains un-
resolved at the highest level of confrontation between union officials . . .
and company officials . . . it will be submitted to an arbitrator, volunta-
rily selected by the parties to the contract.
R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 541-42 (1976).
" In the teamster system, the framework for grievance processing is set forth in the
local supplemental agreements which expand on the master agreements. See United
Parcel Service Teamsters Local 623 Supplemental Agreement art. 41, § 2 (covering
May 1, 1982 through June 1, 1985) ("A grievance is hereby jointly defined to be any
controversy, complaint, misunderstanding or dispute arising as to interpretation, appli-
cation or observance of any of the provisions of this Agreement or Supplements
hereto.") [on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review] [hereinafter cited as
Supplemental Agreement].
I See, e.g., National Master United Parcel Agreement: "Under no circumstances
will an employee be required or assigned to engage in any activity involving dangerous
(1453)
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result of pressure by the union on her employer because of her mem-
bership in Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU).
6
In accordance with the local Teamster grievance procedure," the
grievance is submitted to a Teamster joint grievance committee, an ad-
judicatory body composed of equal numbers of management and labor
representatives.' After a brief hearing, the committee denies the griev-
ance upon a finding that there was "just cause" for the dismissal, as
required by the collective bargaining agreement.9 The committee's
'"opinion" consists of the curt statement, "Based on the facts of the case,
the grievance is denied."1° Convinced that her membership in TDU
conditions of work or danger to a person or property or in violation of a government
regulation relating to safety of person or equipment." National Master United Parcel
Service Agreement, art. 18, § 1 (covering May 1, 1982 through June 1, 1985) [on file
at University of Pennsylvania Law Review] [hereinafter cited as Master Agreement].
6 TDU is a "national organization of rank and file Teamsters dedicated to re-
forming the Teamsters Union and making it more responsive to its members." Brief of
Appellant at 4, Finn v. Yellow Freight Sys., No. 83-1769 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 1984).
7 See, e.g., Supplemental Agreement, supra note 4, art. 41, § 2. Under the Local
623 Agreement, grievance procedures may only be invoked by authorized union repre-
sentatives. See id. An employee is required to report grievances to her shop steward in
writing within five working days. The steward then submits the grievance to the super-
visor for adjustment and a meeting date is arranged. See id. § 2(a). If there is no
agreement, the steward must report the matter to the union who "shall attempt to
adjust the same with the Employer within five (5) days." See id. § 2(b). If no decision
is reached or no settlement agreed upon, and if the grievance relates to the supplemen-
tal agreement and not to the interpretation or application of the master agreement, the
matter is then submitted within ten days to the Atlantic Area Parcel Grievance Com-
mittee (AAPGC). See id. § 2(c)(1). All discharge cases, however, are heard monthly on
a designated date by the AAPGC. See id. § 3(g). In discharge cases, an impartial arbi-
trator sits along with-union and management representatives in order to render a decid-
ing vote should the committee split evenly. See id.
I Joint grievance committees are provided for in Teamster collective bargaining
agreements. See, e.g., Supplemental Agreement, supra note 4, art. 41, § 3.
9 The "just cause" standard protects the employee from discharge at the whim of
the employer. Again, the United Parcel Service Teamsters Local 623 Supplemental
Agreement is illustrative:
The Employer shall not discharge nor suspend any employee without just
cause until the case has been discussed with the Business Agent in person,
where practical, except where the provisions of this Article provide for
discharge, but in respect to suspension or discharge shall give at least one
warning notice of the complaint against such employee to the employee, in
writing . ...
Supplemental Agreement, supra note 4, art. 43. Allowable causes for discharge are a
mandatory subject of bargaining. See R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 504.
'0 There are no recorded decisions in Teamster joint grievance committee proceed-
ings. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Early v. Eastern Transfer, 699 F.2d 552
(1st Cir.), cert.denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983). Generally, efficiency is the primary reason
for the dearth of written opinions. The committees hear a staggering number of cases,
as many as thirty in one day. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. It is obvious
that agreements are more easily reached without the complications of "agreeing" to a
written rationale for the decision.
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affected the impartiality of the joint committee, the employee files an
unfair labor practice complaint with the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) claiming that the employer violated section 8(a)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)11 by discouraging her mem-
bership in a labor organization.
The NLRB dismisses the complaint, following its long-standing
"deferral" policy 1 2 of refusing to consider complaints that have been at
least partially the subject of an arbitrator's decision. As a result, the
joint grievance committee's denial of the claim is the final judgment in
the case, and the discharge remains in effect.1"
This hypothetical scenario raises many questions about the propri-
ety of the Board's policy of deferring to arbitration, particularly when
the arbitral body receiving the deference is not a neutral arbitrator but
rather a joint grievance committee. The Board's deferral policy must be
considered in light of the NLRA, the statute that provides the frame-
work for the American labor relations system. Section 7 evinces the
fundamental aims of the Act:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activi-
ties except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3)
of this title.
1 4
National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1982). Citations to the NLRA include references to its amendments.
12 "Deferral policy," while technically inaccurate, is the term of art used by the
Board:
"Deferral" means postponement; e.g., postponement of a Board decision
until after an arbitrator has decided the case .... [TIhe issue [however]
in this area of labor law is whether the Board will give deference to the
arbitrator's decision on a statutory issue in a particular case. Thus, "defer-
ence policy" would be more accurate, but "deferral policy" is the accepted
term of art.
Comment, Judicial Review and the Trend Toward More Stringent NLRB Standards
on Arbitral Deferrals, 129 U. PA. L. Rxv. 738, 739 n.5 (1981).
13 See, e.g., Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., No. JD-91-84, slip op. at 7 (NLRB
Div. of Judges, Socoloff, A.L.J., Mar. 12, 1984) (dismissing complaint concerning sus-
pension of employees); infra text accompanying notes 131-49.
14 National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section
8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." Id. at § 8(a)(1),
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Two types of rights are provided and protected by the NLRA,
individual rights and collective rights. The individual's right to engage
in union membership, free from discrimination by an employer or an-
other union, is established in sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), and
8(b)(2), 5 while sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), which deal with the ag-
gregate relationship of the employees with the employer, protect collec-
tive rights by mandating collective bargaining."6
In the hypothetical situation framed at the outset of this Comment,
tensions between collective rights and individual rights are apparent.
The NLRB is responsible for enforcing the Act through the adjudica-
tion of unfair labor practice claims."7 It is questionable, however,
whether the Board is fulfilling its task when it defers to a Teamster
joint grievance committee. This Comment considers the impact of the
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for
the union to so act in restraint of the employees' section 7 rights. Id. § 8(b)(1)(A), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1982).
1" National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A),
8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3), 158(b)(1)(A), 158(b)(2) (1982). Section
8(a)(1) is a catch-all provision, making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(3) provides that employers may not dis-
criminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-
ployment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Section 8(b)(1)(a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to
"restrain or coerce ...employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7 . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1). Section 8(b)(2) prohibits a union from causing an em-
ployer to discriminate in violation of section 8(a)(3) and from discriminating itself
"against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues
and the initiation fees." National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(2) (1982).
10 National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (1982). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for
the employer to "refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ-
ees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Section 8(b)(3) applies the same provision to the union.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3).
17 See National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1982).
Inherent in any consideration of substantive issues in labor law are tensions that
reflect underlying interests and philosophies in our democratic society. As Professors
Summers, Wellington and Hyde note, "Here power is shared between the law and
private institutions-unions and management-with the law enhancing, structuring
and curbing the power of these private institutions. We, therefore, constantly address
the general problem of defining the relative role of public and private processes in
ordering a democratic society." C. SUMMERS, H. WELLINGTON & A. HYDE, LABOR
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xxiii (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as C. SUMMERS].
The relationship between the Teamster joint grievance committee system and the Board
reflects this tension, innate in American labor law, between public and private regula-
tion. It is essentially a political and philosophical quandary. Just how much power one
is prepared to allow the Teamster committees to exercise depends upon one's concep-
tion of what the Act requires the Board to protect and to what extent.
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NLRB's deferral to the Teamster's "arbitration""8 process on the rights
of the individual employee. First, the Comment discusses the form and
procedure of the Teamster joint grievance committee system. Second, it
analyzes the development of the Board's deferral policy with an eye
toward the Board's philosophy regarding individual and collective
rights. Third, it questions the advisability of deference to joint commit-
tee decisions.
The Comment concludes that, in the Teamster context, the
Board's deferral policy must distinguish between grievances involving
individual rights and those involving collective rights. In cases involving
alleged violations of collective rights, deferral is a commendable way of
effectuating the Supreme Court's conception of arbitration as an exten-
sion of the collective bargaining system,19 since the joint grievance com-
mittees allow management and the union to negotiate over contract in-
terpretation. Conversely, in individual rights cases, the Teamster
system does not adequately protect the individual from management or
union discrimination. In effect, it mandates negotiation over whether
the statute has been violated and places the alleged violators in the posi-
tion of deciding the outcome of the grievance. To resolve this problem,
the Comment suggests that the Board should refuse to defer in cases of
alleged unfair labor practices between the individual employee and ei-
ther her employer or her union. By deferring in cases involving collec-
tive rights and adjudicating cases involving individual rights, the Board
will at once realize the goals both of private, contractual dispute resolu-
tion and protection of individual employee rights.
I. THE TEAMSTER JOINT GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE SYSTEM
The joint grievance committee is an established institution within
the Teamsters Union, initially adopted as a contractual dispute-resolu-
tion system by the Central States Drivers Council of the Teamsters in
1938.20 There is no specific committee form or procedure that obtains
'a The Board, without setting forth any basis for its conclusion, has termed the
Teamster joint grievance committee system "arbitration" and has accorded it all the
deference generally accorded neutral arbitrators. Analysis casts doubt on the propriety
of treating the Teamster committees as neutral arbitrators. See infra notes 127-73 and
accompanying text.
" The Court espoused this conception of arbitration in a series of cases, known
collectively as the Steelworker's Trilogy. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
20 See Azoff, Joint Committees as an Alternative Form of Arbitration Under the
NLRA, 47 TUL. L. REV. 325, 329 (1973).
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throughout the union; rather the committees are found in "many sizes,
shapes and varieties."2' Significantly, some committees allow economic
recourse 22 if the joint committee "deadlocks" 2 at the last stage of the
grievance procedure, while others provide for arbitration by a neutral if
no majority decision can be reached.
Although the Teamster committees are not uniform, they nonethe-
less share several basic traits. The committees are established under the
collective bargaining agreement and are composed of equal numbers of
management and union representatives. 5 There are usually no neutrals
present at the committee hearings. Local union officials and company
representatives are not permitted to sit on cases in which their respec-
tive organizations are involved.2 6 Instead, representatives of the parties
involved in the dispute present and advocate their positions with respect
to the grievance.2 7 The panel makes its decision immediately after the
conclusion of the hearing. 28 Typically, the committees meet on a regu-
lar basis with a firmly set agenda, determined in advance. 9 The collec-
tive bargaining agreements, however, establish no more than a loosely
21 Miller, Teamster Joint Grievance Committees: The Legal Equivalent of Arbi-
tration, 37 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. [ARBITRATION 1984] 118, 118 (1984).
2' Economic force by the union is typically asserted through a strike or a boycott.
See C. SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 402. It seems incongruous to define the joint griev-
ance committee proceedings as arbitration when a failure to agree at the highest level
leads not to arbitration by a neutral but to economic action. See Feller, A General
Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAIF. L. REv. 663, 838 (1973).
The most sophisticated and indeed the largest Teamster collective bargaining agree-
ment, the National Master Freight Agreement, provides that, should the national com-
mittee fail to reach a majority decision, "either party shall be entitled to all lawful
economic recourse to support its position in the matter." Miller, supra note 21, at 121.
The National Master United Parcel Service Agreement similarly allows work stop-
pages, slowdowns, walkouts or lockouts should the National Grievance Committee fail
to come to a majority decision over a question of the Agreement's interpretation.
Master Agreement, supra note 5, art. 8, § 2.
2 "Deadlock" is the term of art used to describe the situation wherein there is no
majority of committee members in support of one side or the other. See, e.g., Sine v.
Local No. 992 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 644 F.2d 997, 999 n.4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 965 (1981); Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973). "Dead-
lock" in this context means that management has voted to deny the grievance while
labor has voted to uphold it.
24 Miller, supra note 21, at 118.
25 Id. at 119.
28 See, e.g., Rules of Procedure, Eastern Conference Joint Area Committee, art.
IV, § 2 (adopted pursuant to arts. 7 & 8 of the National Master Freight Agreement,
July 1, 1973 to Mar. 31, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Rules of Procedure] [on file at the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
Miller, supra note 21, at 119.
s See id. at 2; see also, Rules of Procedure, supra note 26, art. V, § 1.
29 See Miller, supra note 21, at 119; see also Rules of Procedure, supra note 26,
art. III, §§ 1 & 2 (the Eastern Conference Joint Committee met quarterly with the
docket set twelve days in advance).
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defined framework for the actual workings of the committee system.30
Most of the procedural rules are established by each of the committees
at the various levels of the Teamsters Union.
3 1
Prior to the hearing, it is frequently the case-and indeed ex-
pected-that the employer and the union engaged in the grievance will
contact members of the committee to discuss the case.82 Members may
ask questions or make suggestions indicating their disposition as to the
merits of the grievance. 3 The parties may choose to rely on such com-
ments to focus their arguments or seek a settlement.
At the hearing, the parties present witnesses and testimony as they
desire." The employee, although represented by the union's business
agent, is generally permitted to present her own evidence and witnesses,
but she may not be represented by anyone other than the local union
representative. 5 Any member of the committee may observe the hear-
ing, but only members selected for that particular panel are permitted
to confer or vote.36 Argument may be cut off by a majority vote after all
factual information is presented.17 Decisions are normally reached im-
mediately after each case and either given to the parties at that time or
mailed to them later.38 Few reasons, if any, are ever given for the joint
committee's decision. Typically, the only recorded "opinion" consists of
"grievance denied" or "grievance forwarded."3 9 Majority decisions are
final and binding, and many collective bargaining agreements require
that the parties sign a form in advance of the hearing acknowledging
that fact.40 A deadlocked vote results in the forwarding of the grievance
10 See, e.g., Supplemental Agreement, supra note 4, art. 41, § 3.
s See, e.g., Rules of Procedure, supra note 26, art. IV, §8F 2.
See Davis v. Ryder Truck Lines, 97 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,027, 17,103, 113
L.R.R.M. 2072, 2075 (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 7, 1982) ("The overwhelming weight of the
evidence established that pre-hearing conversations ... are customary procedures
under the National Master Freight Agreement.").
" See Deposition of John W. Shepard at 14 (Sept. 24, 1982), Davis v. Ryder
Truck Lines, 97 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,027, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2072 (S.D. Ohio,
1982). Shepard notes that during pre-hearing discussions, "grievance panel mem-
bers . . .are free to make recommendations or suggestions or be the devil's advocate in
discussing the case." Id.
See, e.g., Rules of Procedure, supra note 26, art. V, § 3.
a' See, e.g., Central States Area Local Cartage Supplemental Agreement, art. 44,
§ 6 (1977) [on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
31 See, e.g., Rules of Procedure, supra note 26, art. V, § 3. Nonetheless, the po-
tential for psychological pressure due to the presence of these "nonparticipating" mem-
bers is significant.
37 See id. art. V, § 1.
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., Sine v. Local 992, Internat'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 664 F.2d 997, 1000
& n.6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Miller, supra note 21, at 126. But
see NLRB v. Wolff & Munier, Inc., 747 F.2d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1984).
40 The Eastern Conference rules, for example, provide:
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to the next highest level of the process.41 Within the system, most of the
Teamster joint committees are organized hierarchically from local to
state, area, and national committees.42 The national committee is usu-
ally an appellate body. Thus, important factual findings relevant to the
validity of the grievance are made at the lower levels.43
The Teamsters present virtually every grievance to a joint commit-
tee for resolution. Unlike other unions that exercise their discretion by
refusing to process spurious claims through arbitration, the Teamsters
put all grievances through the first committee level and union panel
representatives simply vote to deny those they feel are unmeritorious.44
Thus the employee, having received at least a first level grievance hear-
ing, cannot complain that the union refused to act on her dispute. More
importantly, the decision of the joint committee, however poorly re-
corded, provides the Board, in virtually every case, with an "arbitra-
tion" decision to which it may defer.
A uniform Joint Submission Form setting forth an agreement to submit
the grievance to the Committee for final and binding decision without fur-
ther recourse to any other tribunal shall be signed by the parties involved
and submitted . . . prior to the grievance being heard. The Co-Chairman
may refuse to hear any case in which a party refuses to sign the Submis-
sion Form, but if the case is heard, it shall be final and binding on all
parties.
Rules of Procedure, supra note 26, art. IV, § 5.
41 See Miller, supra note 21, at 120-21.
42 See id.; Feller, supra note 22, at 836.
"' As the United Parcel Service Agreement provides: "All grievances involving
questions of fact, as contrasted to questions of interpretation, shall be resolved pursuant
to the provisions relating to the Local, State and Area grievance procedures set forth in
the applicable Supplements to this Agreement." Master Agreement, supra note 5, art.
8, § 6.
44 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 17, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 728 (1981). Indeed, in many
respects
[t]he genius of the Teamster procedure is that the union presents practi-
cally every grievance to a joint committee. Accordingly, discretion to sift
out unmeritorious grievances is exercised not by the local business agent
who "presents" the grievance, but by the union representatives . ...
[W]henever a member's grievance is denied, the Union representatives
must have voted to deny the grievance; had they voted to sustain it, the
committee would have deadlocked . . ..
Petition For A Writ of Certiorari at 9-10, Early v. Eastern Transfer, 699 F.2d 552 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Petition].
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NLRB DEFERRAL POLICY: AN
OVERVIEW
A. Congress and the Supreme Court
In 1947 Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act45 and thereby
adopted a policy of supporting private dispute resolution in labor-man-
agement relations. 46 Unions and management thereafter began includ-
ing arbitration clauses in their agreements, whereby they agreed to re-
solve disputes over contract interpretation in arbitration rather than
through economic forces. As a result, collective bargaining agreements
that contain arbitration clauses are more than contracts: "each is an
attempt to create an instrument of industrial self-government.
1
4
7
Following Congress' endorsement of private dispute resolution, the
Supreme Court delineated the courts' role in the arbitration process. In
the seminal case, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,4" the Court
held that section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act 9 "authorizes federal
courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these
collective bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law
specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective
bargaining agreements. ' 50 Three years later, in the landmark Steel-
workers Trilogy,51 the Supreme Court further endorsed the national
policy favoring grievance arbitration. In United Steelworkers v. War-
Labor Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97
(1982).
46 Section 203(d) states: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the par-
ties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment." Labor Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1982).
47 Azoff, supra note 20, at 325 (citing Schulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in
Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 1004 (1955)).
48 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
4' Labor Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1982). Section 301(a) states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
5* Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451. See R. GORMAN,
supra note 3, at 544-45.
1 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 2 Justice Douglas, writing for the major-
ity, enthusiastically embraced the arbitration process and noted that
grievance machinery established by a collective bargaining agreement is
"at the very heart of . . .industrial self-government.""3 "Arbitration,"
he continued, "is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a
system of private law for all the problems which may arise and to pro-
vide for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the
variant needs and desires of the parties.
54
B. The National Labor Relations Board
The Board is charged with the difficult task of adjudicating al-
leged violations of the NLRA,55 while arbitration is the favored system
for contractual dispute resolution. 6 Actual cases, however, rarely pre-
sent situations that fall squarely into the category of "contract interpre-
tation" on the one hand, or "statutory interpretation" on the other. As
Professor Gorman has noted, "A single transaction, involving an em-
ployer, its employees and their union, may give rise to two kinds of
claims: one for breach of contract under the parties' collective bargain-
ing agreement, and the other for application of the provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act."'57 Because of the difficulty in separat-
ing the two types of claims, and the Board's concern with the overlap of
resources in having the NLRB and the arbitrator deciding parallel is-
sues, the Board has consistently followed a policy of deferring to
arbitration. 8
52 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
53 Id. at 581.
5' Id.
5 The Board is responsible for preventing any person from engaging in an unfair
labor practice as defined in Section 8 of the Act. National Labor Relations [Wagner]
Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
" See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
57 R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 729.
5' The roots of the Board's deferral policy can be traced to a series of cases. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Walt Disney Prods., 146 F.2d 44, 49 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 877 (1945) (Board deferring to arbitrator's conclusion that Walt Disney discrimi-
nated against employee because of employee's union activity); Monsanto Chem. Co., 97
N.L.R.B. 517, 520 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953) (Board ruled that it
was not bound by law to arbitrator's award because the case involved the interpretation
of a statute).
For criticism and discussion of deferral policy, see Finston, The Board's Role in
the Arbitral Process, 32 LAB. L.J. 799 (1981); Novack, Cutting Back on Collyer: The
First Step in the Right Direction, 28 LAB. L.J. 785 (1977); Simon-Rose, Deferral
Under Collyer by the NLRB of Section 8(aX3) Cases, 27 LAB L.J. 201 (1976); Note,
NLRB Deferral to Arbitration: The Evolution of the Spielberg Doctrine, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 291 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Evolution of the Spielberg Doc-
trine]; Note, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191 (1968).
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There are two branches of the Board's deferral policy.59 Both are
founded on the premise that activity forming the basis for an unfair
labor practice charge is covered by both the Act and the applicable col-
lective bargaining agreement.6" The first branch of deferral, established
in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,"1 represents complete deferral to the
arbitral process. At issue in Spielberg was an employer's refusal to re-
instate workers dismissed for conduct allegedly engaged in during a
strike.62 The strike settlement required that the union and employer
arbitrate the issue of reinstatement; the arbitration panel held that the
employer need not reinstate the employees. The employees subse-
quently sought relief before the NLRB, claiming a violation of their
8(a)(3)6" right to participate in a labor organization free from threat of
discharge.
Noting that the arbitration award was not "at odds with the stat-
ute" and that all parties had "acquiesced in the arbitration proceed-
ing,""5 the Board deferred to the arbitration panel's decision.6" In so
doing, the Board established the criteria that have formed the backbone
of its deferral policy. In cases involving issues previously decided by an
arbitrator, the Board will defer if "the proceedings appear to have been
fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of
the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and poli-
cies of the Act."61 7 According to the Board, if this three-pronged test is
met, the "desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of
labor disputes will best be served by our recognition of the arbitrator's
award."68
The Spielberg opinion offers little to support its result. The Board
cited no authority to support its conclusion that deferral was appropri-
ate, and explained neither how the criteria for deferral were developed
59 See Finston, supra note 58, at 799; Comment, supra note 12, at 739. See gener-
ally Note, Evolution of the Spielberg Doctrine, supra note 58.
60 For example, an employer is charged with making unilateral changes in wages
in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. National Labor Relations [Wag-
ner] Act § 8(a)(1), (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1982). In addition to the unfair
labor question charge, there is a question about the interpretation of the parties' collec-
tive bargaining agreement: does a management prerogatives clause contained therein
allow the employer to make such unilateral wage changes?
61 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
62 Id. at 1081.
63 Id., referring to National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1982).
Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
" Id.
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nor how the criteria would protect section 7 rights. In fact, the Board
never mentioned section 7 rights, but rather focused on "the desirable
objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor disputes."6
Given the Board's lack of analysis in Spielberg, one can only speculate
about why the Board decided to exercise its discretion to defer.70 It is
likely that the Board wanted to encourage arbitration for the same rea-
sons advanced by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy: to
encourage voluntary settlement of disputes"1 and to rely on the knowl-
edge of the law of the shop possessed by arbitrators. 2
These considerations may be appropriate in a collective rights dis-
pute where the union can be expected to represent adequately its own
collective interests. In an individual rights dispute, however, the union
may not have equivalent incentives to protect the aggrieved individual's
rights, and thus there exists the risk that individual rights will be sacri-
ficed to the promotion of the Steelworkers Trilogy goals of settlement
and arbitral expertise. Additionally, courts, not arbitrators, have exper-
tise in the protection of individual rights. 8
The Board's policy of deferring in disputes involving the NLRA
and those involving a contract is not required by any law. " Spielberg,
69 Id.
70 Deferral is an exercise of the Board's discretionary power to administer, de-
velop, and enforce national labor policy. While Congress and the courts have provided
general policy guidelines for the NLRB to follow (express support for arbitration as a
dispute resolution process is one example), the guidelines are often devoid of specific
rules for the implementation of the policy. Hence, the Board's "back and forth wander-
ings . . . in the wilderness of deferral to arbitration," C. SuMMRm, supra note 17,
tend to illustrate the Board's discretionary power as well as the role of politics in the
formulation of Board policy. The Board, like many administrative agencies, develops
policy through adjudication rather than rulemaking, and, indeed, frequently in its his-
tory, Board members have simply overruled the prior policy and begun anew. The
history of deferral policy is illustrative of this phenomenon. See infra notes 59-126 and
accompanying text.
71 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566
(1960).
11 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 596 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
7 See C. SuMMmS, supra note 17, at 853 (discussing Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
"I "[Tihere is no statutory reason why the Board cannot, in the context of decid-
ing a statutory rights dispute, accept an arbitrator's decision on a related contractual
question while refusing to give any deference to the arbitrator's decision on the statu-
tory issue." Comment, supra note 12, at 743.
It seems that the Board's decision in Spielberg was an attempt to address the
problems the Board felt were raised where an employer's action is alleged to violate
both the contract and the statute. The Board was "implicitly attempting to accommo-
date the tension it erroneously perceived between two statutory provisions, section 10(a)
of the NLRA and section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations [Taft-Hartley]
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however, allows for such deferral and raises the question of whether
the Board has abdicated its statutory obligation to protect individual
rights. "Does a completely fair arbitration of the employee's contractual
rights give any assurance that the employee's statutory rights have been
protected" ?75 How appropriate is such a vaguely defined standard as
"clearly repugnant" when the contract and the statute may conceivably
differ as to acceptable conduct by the employer?"0
The Spielberg decision not only formed the foundation for Board
deferral policy, but also set the tone for the Board's future treatment of
the deferral doctrine. Sixteen years after Spielberg, the Board formu-
lated the second branch of its deferral policy in Collyer Insulated Wire,
A Gulf & Western Systems Co. 7 The General Counsel"' charged that
Act (LMRA)." Comment, supra note 12, at 742-43. Section 10(a) deals solely with
statutory rights: "[T]he Board is empowered ...to prevent any person from engaging
in any unfair labor practice ...affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected
by any other means of adjustment ...that has been or may be established by agree-
ment, law, or otherwise." National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(a) (1982). Conversely, section 203(d) deals with contractual rights. See Com-
ment, supra note 12, at 743; see also Labor Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act
§ 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982). The ultimate question then, is whether the
Board should have balanced these two statutory provisions. See Comment, supra note
12, at 743, 763-65 (arguing that the Board was incorrect in undertaking the process of
balancing section 10(a) and 203(d) because the Board has a responsibility to adjudicate
statutory disputes, even if such adjudication would disrupt a voluntary contractual
agreement).
75 C. SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 856-57.
76 See id. The prevailing Board definition of "clearly repugnant" is central to the
degree of deference that the Board will be willing to accord to arbitral decisions. In
1978 and 1979 Member Truesdale urged that the "clearly repugnant" to the purposes
of the Act standard be modified to require that "the arbitrator's legal conclusions [be]
consistent with Board law." Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1149 (1979)
(Truesdale, concurring); see also Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 867-69
(1978) (Truesdale, concurring). Such a standard would, in effect, give the Board the
power to refuse deference in virtually any case in which it disagreed with the result.
Earlier, the Board had interpreted the "clearly repugnant" standard to mean "pal-
pably wrong." See International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 928-29 (1962) (case
dismissed), enforced sub noma. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
In 1984, the Board made clear that it was following the more deferential "palpa-
bly wrong" standard:
[D]ifferences, if any, between the contractual and statutory standards of
review should be weighed by the Board as part of its determination under
the Spielberg standards of whether an award is "dearly repugnant" to the
Act. And, with regard to the inquiry into the "clearly repugnant" stan-
dard, we would not require an arbitrator's award to be totally consistent
with Board precedent. Unless the award is "palpably wrong," i.e., unless
the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent
with the Act, we will defer.
Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 n.7 (1984) (emphasis added).
77 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
78 The NLRB is actually composed of two distinct branches. The five-member
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the employer had made unilateral changes in wages and conditions of
employment in violation of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act.79
The case turned on the interpretation of the parties' collective bargain-
ing agreement, which provided for the employer to implement wage
adjustments.80 The employer argued that the dispute should have been
adjudicated in the grievance procedure provided for in the contract.81
The Board found merit in the employer's contentions "because this dis-
pute in its entirety arises from the contract between the parties"82 and
deferred consideration of the dispute pending arbitration.8
After engaging in the obligatory salutations to the arbitration pro-
cess," the NLRB defended its decision by pointing to the factors that it
had considered:
[Tlhis dispute arises within the confines of a long and pro-
ductive collective-bargaining relationship. . . .[N]o claim is
made of enmity by [the employer] to employees' exercise of
protected rights. [The employer] has credibly asserted its
willingness to resort to arbitration under a clause providing
for arbitration ....
. . .The contract and its meaning . . .lie at the center
of this dispute.85
As a result, the Board concluded that the grievance was "emi-
nently well suited to resolution by arbitration."8 8 It was, as the plural-
Board, appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate for five year terms,
performs the agency's adjudicative function, while the office of the General Counsel,
with the General Counsel appointed to a four year term under the same procedure,
"has authority to investigate charges of unfair labor practices, to decide whether com-
plaints should be issued on the basis of these charges and to direct the prosecution of
such complaints." A. Cox, D. BoK, & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LA-
BOR LAW 104 (1981). The General Counsel also represents the Board in proceedings
to revise or enforce its decisions and interprets Board decisions in order to determine
how to apply Board law. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 104-13.
11 Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 837-39.
80 Id. at 837-39.
81 See id. at 837.
82 Id.at 839.
83 Id. at 843. The Board retained jurisdiction to entertain a subsequent motion for
further consideration if the dispute was not resolved in the grievance procedure, if the
dispute was not submitted to arbitration "with reasonable promptness," if the grievance
procedures were not fair and regular, or if the result reached in the grievance or arbi-
tration process was repugnant to the Act. Id.
" "[D]isputes such as these can better be resolved by arbitrators with special skill
and experience in deciding matters arising under established bargaining relationships
than by the application by this Board of a particular provision of our statute." Id. at
839.
85 Id. at 842.
88 Id.
[Vol. 133:1453
TEAMSTERS AND NLRB DEFERRAL
ity noted, "the very stuff of labor contract arbitration."8 7 Ardent dis-
sents by members Fanning and Jenkins"8 claimed that Collyer
redefined Spielberg by mandating "compulsory arbitration.""9 In re-
sponse, the plurality suggested that rather than compelling arbitration,
Collyer deferral was "merely giving full effect to [the parties'] own vol-
untary agreements . . . rather than permitting such agreements to be
sidestepped and permitting the substitution of our processes, a forum
not contemplated by their own agreement."90
The Collyer decision, as a case involving only collective rights,
clearly reflects the policies underlying the Act and the exhortations of
the Steelworkers Trilogy. However, the same Board's decision in Na-
tional Radio Company9' is more difficult to justify. In National Radio
the Board held that it was empowered to defer action with regard to
alleged violations of individual rights pending arbitration, provided that
"on balance, to do so [would] advance the policies and purposes of the
Act."9 2 The case concerned an allegation that the employer had violated
section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally instituting a policy whereby union repre-
sentatives were required to report to their supervisors when leaving
designated work areas in order to conduct union grievance business."
This allegation was coupled with a charge that the employer's disci-
plining of an employee who failed to comply with the reporting re-
quirement was motivated by anti-union animus and thus violated sec-
tion 8(a)(3).9
The Board faced a situation that was at once analogous to and
distinct from Collyer. The grievance necessarily required an interpreta-
tion of the relevant contract provisions,9" an area within the special
87 Id.
88 Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 846 (Fanning, dissenting), 850 (Jenkins, dissenting).
Fanning and Jenkins not only dissented in Collyer, but continued to dissent "in every
subsequent case in which the Board invoked or expanded upon the Collyer principle of
deferral to unused arbitral procedures." R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 752.
89 Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 847.
90 Id. at 842. Collyer presented the ideal situation for deferral: "A Board decision
would have required an analysis of contract terms, bargaining history and plant prac-
tices-precisely the task normally given to arbitrators, for which the Supreme Court
has consistently held them specially qualified." R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 753.
B1 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
92 Id. at 531 (footnote omitted). Once again, the Board retained jurisdiction to
"preserve the right of the Charging Party to seek from ... [the NLRB] vindication of
statutory rights should the arbitration reach a result not tolerable under the statute."
Id.
11 See id. at 527.
" See id. at 530.
" See id. at 529-30 (The complaint dealt with provisions in the collective bargain-
ing agreement covering the employer's right to establish rules concerning plant opera-
tion, the union's right to "free movement" within the plant, whether the disciplinary
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realm of competence of the arbitrator. Nonetheless, the section 8(a)(3)
charge required a resolution of factual questions with regard to the
presence of anti-union animus. In short, National Radio involved is-
sues concerning both collective and individual rights.9" In Collyer, the
resolution of the contract dispute also resolved the unfair labor practice
issue.9" If the employer's activities were permissible under the collective
bargaining agreement, its adoption of the procedure without prior bar-
gaining would not be an unfair labor practice because the issue was
bargained over when the collective agreement was reached. Conversely,
if the contract did not provide for the employer's actions, its refusal to
bargain before taking action would be an unfair labor practice: a fail-
ure to bargain over terms and conditions of employment.9 National
Radio is, however, distinguishable from Collyer because there was a
"narrow penumbra" 9 wherein the reporting procedure might well
have been within the employer's rights under the contract, but still a
violation of the Act because it was motivated by anti-union animus.100
Presumably, the question of anti-union animus is a factual one
within the special competence of the NLRB. With this "narrow pe-
numbra" in mind, the Board noted that it would have to be "especially
cautious in declining to assert the exclusive jurisdiction" of the NLRB
with respect to protecting and remedying alleged violations of section
8.101 Nonetheless, the Board extended its deference to the arbitration
system, explicitly stating that it had the power to do so and that such
deference served the purposes of the NLRA.1 2 Finding the employer's
argument that arbitration would lead to a decision that would not be
repugnant to the Act to be a "tenable assumption,"103 the Board sup-
ported its assertion that the basic considerations underlying Collyer
were equally applicable in National Radio: "Here, as [in Collyer], an
asserted wrong is remediable in both a statutory and a contractual fo-
rum. Both jurisdictions exist by virtue of Congressional action, and our
duty to serve the objectives of Congress requires that we seek a rational
action was for just cause, and how these provisions were affected by course of dealing.).
See General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810-11 (1977) (Murphy,
Chairman, concurring).
I See 198 N.L.R.B. at 530.
98 See National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1982).
" National Radio, 198 N.L.R.B. at 530.
o00 See id.
10' Id. ("[T]here does exist that possibility that a contractually sound and entirely
proper arbitrator's award might fail to dispose of all issues arising under the Act.").
102 Id.
103 Id. at 531.
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accommodation within that duality."''°4 Certainly it is debatable
whether or not the Board's duty "requires" or even allows it to defer to
an arbitrator in cases involving statutory individual rights-rights that
Congress charged the Board to protect. The Board, nevertheless,
equated its policy of abstention not with abdication but with fostering
collective bargaining and industrial self-government.
0 5
After the 1976 Presidential election and attendant change in Board
membership, members Fanning and Jenkins found themselves either in
a majority or a plurality with regard to certain issues before the
NLRB.'0 They took the opportunity to implement as Board policy
their long line of dissents on the deferral question. In General Ameri-
can Transportation Corp.,'07a plurality moved away from Collyer,
concluding that the NLRB cannot give up or share its statutory duty to
decide unfair labor practice questions:
[W]e believe that the Board has a statutory duty to hear and
to dispose of unfair labor practices and that the Board can-
not abdicate or avoid its duty by seeking to cede its jurisdic-
tion to private tribunals. . . . Section 10(a) of the Act is ex-
plicit that the Board's power to prevent unfair labor
practices "shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment . . "1s08
Additionally, the plurality emphasized that section 8(a)(3) protected in-
dividual rights, as compared to union or group rights. 09 "[W]here the
charging party is an individual discriminatee seeking to enforce his in-
dividual rights," deferral would destroy the voluntary nature of arbitra-
204 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
105 See id. at 531-32. The Board found that "wholly aside from considerations
arising from the increasing caseload before this five-man Board . . .the purposes of
the Act are well served by encouraging the parties to those contracts to resolve their
disputes without government intervention." Id. (footnote omitted).
Members Fanning and Jenkins, in their dissent, asserted that by deferring to arbi-
tration, the Board was engaging in "subcontracting to a private tribunal the determina-
tion of whether [rights conferred and guaranteed solely by the] statute" were violated.
Id. at 533 (Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting). "Such action mocks the statute and tei
reason for this Board's existence." Id.
106 In 1977 the Board consisted of Members Fanning and Jenkins in one block,
and Members Panello and Walther in another. Chairman Murphy provided the
cswing" vote on the issue of whether or not to defer. Although she gave Fanning and
Jenkins her vote in General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977), she did not
agree with their general position that the Board la~ks the statutory authority to defer
any unfair labor practice allegation. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
107 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
108 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act
§ 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982)).
109 228 N.L.R.B. at 808.
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tion, the main reason for Collyer deferral, by forcing employees into the
arbitral process for a resolution of their claims.11 By invoking Board
processes, the charging party was acting upon the conclusion that arbi-
tration would be futile.
11'
The Board's opinion in General American Transportation, while
significant, was perhaps less noteworthy than the concurrence of Chair-
man Murphy who provided the "swing vote" and thus actually defined
the Board's holding.L12 The Chairman agreed with the Board's unwill-
ingness to defer in General American Transportation, but could not
agree with the broad holding that the Board lacked the statutory au-
thority to defer any unfair labor practice complaint to arbitration."1 '
Unlike members Fanning and Jenkins, the Chairman analyzed the
deferral controversy by distinguishing between unfair labor practices
growing out of differences between the parties as to the "interpretation
and/or application of their collective-bargaining agreement"-an area
appropriate for deferral, and unfair labor practices involving alleged
110 See id. at 808-09.
1 See id. at 808.
uS See supra note 107. Despite her disagreement with a broad reading of General
Am. Transp., Chairman Murphy nonetheless agreed with Members Fanning and Jen-
kins that deferral was inappropriate based on the facts of the case. She felt, however,
that deferral was appropriate in Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. 828 (1977),
decided on the same day. The Chairman, again concurring, agreed with Members
Panello and Walther that the facts of Roy Robinson Chevrolet warranted deferral:
In view of the massive judicial approval of Collyer by the courts . . .Col-
lyer must be accepted as law binding upon the Board under American
legal tradition, notwithstanding the fact that some individual Board mem-
bers may not agree with it. Board members may disagree with its applica-
tion, but at this point in time they are not free, we believe, to treat the
doctrine as a nullity."
Id. at 829. Thus, because on the facts of the case resolution of the contract interpreta-
tion issue would necessarily resolve the 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) allegations, the Board opted
to defer. Id. ("[T]he purposes of the Act will best be discharged by deferring the issue
in dispute to the grievance-arbitration procedure which the parties themselves have cre-
ated . . ... "). The Chairman expressed her agreement with Collyer's premise that the
NLRB had the discretionary authority to defer to the grievance-arbitration procedure
of the parties when issues involving "purely the interpretation of the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties under a collective-bargaining agreement" were presented. Id. at
831. The Chairman could not agree, however, that the Board should exercise its discre-
tion to defer to the parties' processes when violations of section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) or
section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(2) were alleged. Id.
The Chairman's concurrences in General Am. Transp. and Roy Robinson Chev-
rolet are consistent because she refuses to consider section 8(a)(1) claims as independent
of the underlying charge of either section 8(a)(3) or 8(a)(5). Given section 8(a)(1)'s
availability as a catch-all charge, the Chairman's analysis is sound because failure to
attach section 8(a)(1) to the other substantive charge would allow the employee to avoid
the contract-grievance procedure in pure contract interpretation cases, namely those in-
volving section 8(a)(5) claims.
118 See General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 810 (Murphy, Chairman,
concurring).
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interference with section 7 rights-an area where deferral would be
inappropriate.1 14 In the former case, the dispute is principally between
the contracting parties, while in the latter case, the dispute is between
the employee and either the employer or the union."15 Because the reso-
lution of the contract issue would not necessarily dispose of the unfair
labor practice claim in the latter case, and because arbitration is not
suitable for the resolution of alleged violations of individual rights, the
Chairman urged the reversal of National Radio while noting her con-
tinuing approval of Collyer.116
As in 1976, the 1980 presidential election brought a new adminis-
tration to Washington-an administration that appointed Board Mem-
bers with a different philosophy of labor relations. In January 1984,
the Board overhauled both branches of its deferral policy. In Olin
Corp.117 the Board "clarified" the Spielberg standards for deferral to
arbitration awards. The NLRB will now find that an arbitrator has
decided the unfair labor practice claim if "(1) the contractual issue is
factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitra-
tor was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the un-
fair labor practice." ' 8 Any discrepancy between the contractual and
statutory standards is to be considered by the Board when it makes its
Spielberg determination of whether the decision is "clearly repugnant"
to the NLRA.119 The decision of the arbitrator need not be consistent
with Board precedent; rather, the NLRB will defer unless the arbitra-
tor's decision is "'palpably wrong,' i.e., unless the arbitrator's decision
is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act."1
12 0
Member Zimmerman's dissent questioned the majority's logic:
If the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair la-
bor practice issue, then how can one possibly prove that the
facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice issue have
not been presented to the arbitrator unless one proves the
absurdity that even the facts relevant to the contract issue
were not presented?
1 21
114 Id. at 811-13 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
115 Id. at 813 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring). "By the same token, an allega-
tion that an employee's statutory rights have been invaded by the employer, the union,
or by both ought not to be adjudicated by the very party or parties charged with the
wrongdoing." Id. at 812 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
116 See id. at 811 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
11 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
118 Id. at 574 (footnote omitted).
119 Id.
120 Id.
21 Id. at 579 (Zimmerman, dissenting).
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Zimmerman recognized that the Board was indulging in a presumption
that any evidence of anti-union animus will be presented "unless the
General Counsel can prove that there is no factual parallel between the
issues. The more broadly the Board construes the notion of factual par-
allelism,- the more difficult the General Counsel's task becomes." '122
On the same day that it issued its decision in Olin Corp., the
Board announced its ruling in United Technologies Corp.123 United
Technologies overruled General American Transportation, leaving
only Collyer as modified by National Radio.24 As the Board stated,
"Contrary to the notion of the majority in General American Trans-
portation, deferral is not akin to abdication. It is merely the prudent
exercise of restraint, a postponement of the use of the Board's processes
to give the parties' own dispute resolution machinery a chance to
succeed. "125
Member Zimmerman, also dissenting in United Technologies, dis-
agreed with the return to an expansive deferral policy, finding it to
have four fundamental flaws:
First, a union, without breaching its duty of fair representa-
tion, might not vigorously support an employee's claim...
[because] in balancing individual and collective interests, [the
union] might trade off an employee's statutory right in favor
of some other benefits for employees in the bargaining unit
as a whole. Second, because arbitrators' competency is pri-
marily in "the law of the shop, not the law of the land," they
may lack the competency to resolve the statutory issue[s] in-
volved in the dispute. Third, even if the arbitrator is conver-
sant with the Act, he is limited to determining the dispute in
accordance with the parties' intent under the collective-bar-
gaining agreement. Finally, because the arbitrator's function
is to effectuate the parties' intent rather than enforce the Act,
he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public policies
underlying the Act, thereby depriving an employee of his
protected statutory rights.
1 2 6
112 Id. (footnote omitted).
128 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
124 See id. at 560.
1'" Id. The Board erred in referring to a majority opinion. General Am. Transp.
was decided by a plurality of Fanning and Jenkins, with Murphy providing the swing
vote. Panello and Walther dissented.
126 Id. at 563-64 (Zimmerman, dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Barren-
tine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981)).
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III. DEFERRAL POLICY AND THE JOINT COMMITTEE-THE
BOARD, THE TEAMSTERS, AND THE INDIVIDUAL
Since its 1961 decision in Denver-Chicago Trucking Co.,1"7 the
Board has deferred to a joint grievance committee decision if the deci-
sion withstands analysis under the Spielberg Manufacturing Co. 2'
branch of its deferral policy. In Denver-Chicago Trucking, the Board
was faced squarely with the issue of whether the joint grievance com-
mittee proceedings met the Spielberg standards of fairness and regular-
ity. 29 In finding that the Spielberg standards were met, the Board fo-
cused on procedural fairness"'0 and did not reach the question of
whether the joint grievance committee system can adequately protect
the rights of the individual. The Board's failure to look beyond proce-
dure is troubling because procedural guarantees will not protect the
individual employee if the joint committees are not competent to adjudi-
cate or cannot fairly decide the statutory issue. This lack of concern
with the substantive protection of individual rights has plagued both
the Board and the courts in their considerations of cases involving the
Teamster grievance system.
The recent decision of Carolina Freight Carriers Corp."' fol-
lowed the 1984 modifications in Board deferral policy 32 and illustrates
deferral in the Teamster context. The General Counsel contended that
the employer violated section 8(a)(1) 3" of the Act by punishing em-
ployees for their concerted activity of stopping their vehicles at the noon
hour to update their logs and recording that time as "on-duty not driv-
127 132 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1961).
128 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); see supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
129 See 132 N.L.R.B. at 1419.
120 The Board stated:
[Flailure to adopt the decision of the Joint Committee would imply an
obligation to fix standards of formality in procedure on the part of griev-
ance and arbitration panels which must be met before their awards could
receive endorsement. We consider it enough under Spielberg if the proce-
dures adopted meet normal standards as to sufficiency, fairness, and regu-
larity. . . . Where, as here, the parties have found that the machinery
which they have created for the amicable resolution of their disputes has
adequately served its purpose, we shall accept such a resolution absent
evidence of irregularity, collusion, or inadequate provisions for the taking
of testimony.
132 N.L.R.B. at 1421. In a footnote, the Board stipulated that it did not find it neces-
sary to have a public member sit on grievance panels. Id. at 1421 n.6.
121 No. JD-91-84 (NLRB Div. of Judges, Socoloff, A.L.J., Mar. 12, 1984).
132 See supra notes 117-126 and accompanying text.
l83 National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1982).
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ing."' 4 The logs are required by the Department of Transportation."3 5
The General Counsel also argued that the employer violated section
8(a)(3) " " by discriminating against an employee involved in the log-
ging activity in the assignment of requested runs.1 3 7 The charging par-
ties had first filed contractual grievances with the Joint Maryland Dis-
trict of Columbia Area Committee."" The grievances were denied, and
subsequently the employees sought relief before the NLRB. 3 9
As the Administrative Law Judge (A.L.J.) noted, under Olin
Corp.140 the party seeking to have the Board reject deferral must show
that the standards for deferral have not been met.141 With regards to
the 8(a)(1) violation, the A.L.J. found the record silent as to whether
the joint committee was presented with or considered evidence concern-
ing the concerted nature of the activities,"" an essential requirement for
the statutory claim.143 He found, nevertheless, that the General Coun-
sel "failed to establish that, in fact, evidence of the concerted nature of
the employees' activities was not before the Committee. '"1 " Thus, fol-
lowing Olin Corp., the A.L.J. did not consider the issue on its merits,
but rather deferred to the decision of the grievance committee. " 5
Concerning the 8(a)(3) issue, the A.L.J. found that the General
Counsel's contention of discrimination in assignments was "based upon
the substantial credited record evidence ...that [the employer] har-
bored ill will toward that employee because of his union activi-
ties . . .. "1 Despite this finding, the A.L.J. reasoned that since the
section 8(a)(3) charges were "cognizable under the grievance-arbitra-
tion provisions of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement,"147 and
the employer had expressed a willingness to arbitrate the dispute,
United Technologies Corp.1 48 required deferral.149 Therefore, despite
11 Carolina Freight, slip op. at 3.
15 See id.
1s National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1982).
iS7 See Carolina Freight, slip op. at 3.
1" Id. at 4.
139 See id. The 1982 decisions issued by the Joint Maryland District of Columbia
Area Committee denied the grievances summarily, merely stating that "based upon the
facts presented the claim of the Union is denied." Id.
140 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
141 See Carolina Freight, slip op. at 6 (following Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573,
574 (1984)); supra text accompanying notes 118-21 (standard for deference).
142 See Carolina Freight, slip op. at 4.
143 See id. at 6.
144 Id.
145 See id.
148 Id. at 4-5.
14 Id. at 6.
148 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
149 See Carolina Freight, slip op. at 6-7.
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the fact that the individual employees requested a Board decision on the
dispute, the collective bargaining agreement took precedence in deter-
mining the proper avenue for dispute resolution.
Carolina Freight highlights the problems that may arise with
deferral in the Teamster context and emphasizes the lack of analysis in
the Board's application of its deferral policy to the Teamster commit-
tees. The Supreme Court, like the NLRB, has failed to engage in a
meaningful inquiry into the Teamster system and has been content to
regard the joint committees as arbitral bodies, or at least as their func-
tional equivalent. 150 By deferring to Teamster joint grievance commit-
tee decisions absent extreme circumstances, the NLRB and the courts
have avoided resolving the issue of whether the Teamster system is the
type of dispute resolution process envisioned in and endorsed by the
Taft-Hartley Act151  and the Steelworkers Trilogy.15 2  Examining
150 There is some debate over exactly how enthusiastically the Supreme Court has
embraced the joint grievance committee system and to what degree the Court has actu-
ally interpreted the joint committee process as the equivalent of arbitration. In General
Drivers v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963), the Court did not directly hold that the
Teamster grievance procedure was equivalent to neutral arbitration. Rather, the Court
simply reasoned that because the parties had agreed contractually to be bound by the
process, the employer could not repudiate it. See id. at 519; Feller, Arbitration Without
Neutrals: Joint Committees and Boards, 37 Pnoc. NAT'L AcAD. ARm. [ARBrrRATION
1984] 106, 110 (1984).
Nonetheless, the Teamsters and some circuits rely upon Riss to support the claim
that the Teamster committees are on the same level as neutral arbitrators. Cf Morris v.
Werner-Continental, Inc., 466 F.2d 1185 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965
(1973); Price v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 457 F.2d 605, 611 (3d Cir. 1972).
Feller notes that the Court
has treated joint committee decisions as arbitration although in no case in
which it did so was the question argued [Riss; United Parcel Serv. v.
Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S.
554 (1976); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964)] and in the only
case in which the question was squarely put before it, the Court did not
explicitly affirm its prior language [DelCostello v. International Bd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 451 (1983)].
Feller, supra, at 115.
The circuit courts do not agree on the degree of deference to be accorded the joint
committees. Some circuits have accorded the grievance committees a great deal of defer-
ence. See, e.g., Morris, 466 F.2d at 1190-91 ("[So long as there is an absence of fraud
or bad faith or demonstrated bias or collusion, the decision by the arbitrators, or here,
the Joint Committee, is final and binding and courts are generally powerless to inter-
fere."); Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 437 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1971)
(holding that an employee who has exhausted grievance procedures is ordinarily bound
by a resulting adverse decision which is final and binding). Other circuits have been
less deferential. See, e.g., Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A
priori, when it is impossible to determine what issues the arbitration panel considered,
or if the arbitration panel has not considered the statutory issue fairly and consistently
with the precepts and purposes of the Act, then the Board should . . . not defer.").
151 Labor Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1982).
152 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
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whether the committees are truly arbitration or its equivalent will re-
veal the flaws in the policy of deferring to the committees in cases in-
volving individual rights.
The fundamental issue in the debate over the appropriate role of
the joint committee system is "whether a union should be permitted to
dispose of individuals' grievances in a power context for the best inter-
est of the organization as a whole, or whether it should be required to
obtain the best possible settlement for the individual involved, regard-
less of the impact on the whole. '153 Indeed, the major criticism of the
Teamster joint grievance committee system is its potential for "horse-
trading:"'1 ' the sacrifice of the interests of the individual for the "good"
of the union in the aggregate. While some possibility for "horse-
trading" exists in virtually every union grievance procedure, the Team-
ster system "is structured so as to insure maximization and exploitation
of opportunities for wheeling and dealing." '155 The very foundation of
the system is a variation of "horsetrading." Since the resolution of the
grievance by definition requires the union to vote with management in
order to deny the claim, it is clear to both sides from the outset that
bargaining will resolve the dispute. Rather than any sort of neutral
adjudication on the merits, the decision amounts to either union agree-
ment or disagreement with the basic charge that the management vio-
lated the collective bargaining contract. If the grievance is at best tenu-
ous, the union's bargain is a vote to deny it, thus preserving rapport
with the employer. If the grievance has merit or, in the eyes of a cynic,
if it could potentially benefit the whole of the union's membership, the
union can attempt to exact a price by voting against management.
Possibilities of collusion between the union and the employer are
real, especially if the employee's interest diverges from that of the
union. 56 One of the dangers inherent in this system is "the ease with
which it may be used as a tool for disciplining union members. 1 57 The
individual employee has little recourse in cases of less than flagrant
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
151 Azoff, supra note 20, at 329 (footnote omitted).
a See id. at 328; Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collec-
tive Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251, 270-
72 (1977); Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement and
the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 514, 543 (1974).
155 Azoff, supra note 20, at 328-29.
150 See id. at 329.
157 Id. at 336.
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collusion or bad faith.1 58 While under United Technologies Corp.159 the
Board will not defer if the interests of the union are adverse to those of
the charging party,18 0 that promise is of little solace to the discharged
employee who, rather than merely asserting that the union was unfair,
must show evidence of bias by the union toward the grievant.1 6 Fur-
thermore, even if the employee is successful in proving union bias, she
may still be left without a remedy. Although the Board will not defer to
the committee decision, even the slightest deviation from the contract
may give the employer "just cause" for the discharge. Thus no unfair
labor practice will have been committed, and there is no wrong to rem-
edy. 1 2 The pressure of many grievances requires the committees to
move quickly. 63 Because joint committees give no reasons for their de-
cisions, "there is nothing which can be reviewed in an action to vacate
[a] decision."' "" The informality of the process leads to less than ardent
argument on behalf of the grievant,"" and to abuses in the process.1""
18 See id. at 336-37.
189 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
16O Id. at 560.
161 See Azoff, supra note 20, at 337 (discussing Roadway Express, Inc. 145
N.L.R.B. 513, 515 (1965)).
162 See Azoff, supra note 20, at 336-37.
163 See Tobias, supra note 154, at 542 ("The joint committee hears scores of com-
plicated cases on the same day. To resolve a case, both the company and the union
members must reach agreement. This requirement, coupled with the heavy docket, en-
courages the trading of one case against another. Hearings are short in duration.").
I1 Petition for Certiorari at 10 (footnote omitted), Early v. Eastern Transfer, 699
F.2d 552 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983).
163 The employee's problem is exacerbated by the evidentiary problems present in
fair representation suits under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Labor Management
Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). See Azoff, supra note 20,
at 350 ("In most cases, it is an almost impossible evidentiary problem to dearly show
animus or bad faith even if the court is willing to examine the committee's interpreta-
tion of a contract to see if it is so unreasonable as to manifest bad faith." (footnote
omitted)).
10" In Roberson v. Allied Delivery Sys., No. C81-1982 (N.D. Ohio, complaint
filed Oct. 2, 1981, case settled and dismissed without prejudice, Oct. 28, 1983), a suit
for breach of fair representation under section 301, plaintiff alleged that the Teamsters
breached their duty by allowing certain procedural irregularities to pass without com-
ment during his hearing. At a hearing before the Ohio Joint Committee, plaintiff was
berated by the President of the Ohio Teamsters Conference and the Vice President of
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters whose presence plaintiff alleged violated
Joint State Committee Rule 4(c) which permits only panel members to speak. Memo-
randum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or Remand of Defendant,
Truck Drivers Union Local 407 at 4-5, Roberson. Plaintiff's affidavit was more
explicit:
After both sides had pretty much presented their cases, Mr. Presser spoke.
He berated me and my business agent. He called my grievance "the worst
piece of shit I've ever heard." He told me "You're out!" He called me a
"trouble-maker." No one objected to nor challenged Mr. Presser's re-
marks. No one sought to rebut his remarks. No one sought to have Mr.
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Union and management representatives may be concerned with other
matters affecting their collective bargaining position. "Both union and
employer panel members often have fixed opinions concerning the sub-
ject matter of the dispute, based not only upon their friendships and
relationships with the litigants, but also upon prior knowledge of the
case and upon their knowledge of similar controversies involving their
own unions or companies."16 This knowledge of the "law of the shop"
illustrates the virtue of the joint committee system in contract interpre-
tation cases, while it poignantly displays the difficulties that an individ-
ual faces in pursuing her statutory claim.
By definition, claims of violations of individual rights guaranteed
under the NLRA will involve a charge that either the employer or the
union has discriminated. In either case, the alleged violator sits in judg-
ment. As such, the employee may proceed under the contract "just
cause" standard rather than alleging discrimination, so as not to "of-
fend" members of the joint committee. 68 As the dissent in Olin Corp.
notes, the Board will presume that the arbitrator has been presented
generally with the facts necessary to resolve the unfair labor practice
issue. 69 The Board's position, as interpreted by the General Counsel,
is that the Board will defer if the grievance alleges that the discharge
was not for "just cause," since the arbitrator will be analyzing whether
the contractual standard of "just cause" is reached, and that analysis
would be factually parallel to that of the statutory issue. If, however,
the grievance merely alleged that the employee was innocent or did not
deserve the discharge, the analysis would not be factually parallel and
the Board would therefore not defer.
170
The Board's deferral policy puts a grievant who claims both statu-
tory and contractual violations in an awkward position. Olin requires
that the party seeking nondeferral prove that "one or more of the
Spielberg-Olin standards has not been met."1 ' Given the lack of a re-
Presser's remarks stricken from the record. No one challenged Mr.
Presser's right to speak.
Affidavit of Gregory Roberson at 2, Roberson. Needless to say, plaintiff's grievance was
denied. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 5,
Roberson.
167 Tobias, supra note 154, at 542.
'- See Mason & Dixon Lines, 237 N.L.R.B. 6, 12 (1978).
a Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 579 (1984) (Zimmerman, dissenting) ("In re-
ality the majority's new test involves only one step. It will presume that an arbitrator
has considered both contract and unfair labor practice issues unless the General Coun-
sel can prove that there is no factual parallel between the issues.").
171 Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum GC 84-10, Guideline Memo-
randum Concerning Olin Corp., Daily Labor Report (BNA) (June 26, 1984) at C-9.
171 Id. at C-9 to C-10.
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corded decision in the joint committee process, this is a difficult burden
to meet. Thus, the charging party is caught in a Catch-22 situation. If
she raises the issue before the joint committee and loses, the Board will
defer to the decision. Conversely, if she fails to raise the issue so as to
avoid antagonizing committee members, she may lose before the com-
mittee and find herself without proof that the unfair labor practice is-
sue was not before the joint panel.
Given the difficulties with the Teamster system in the area of indi-
vidual rights, this Comment proposes that the Board should develop a
separate policy applicable to alleged violations of individual rights. The
beauty of the Teamster system is that it is well suited to resolve collec-
tive disputes. Yet in cases involving violations of individual rights, the
Board's broad deference to joint committee decisions without any real
inquiry into the substance of the proceedings ignores the statutory pro-
tections for the individual that Congress explicitly included in the
NLRA.
To achieve this selective deferral, the Board should develop guide-
lines for the thorough review of joint committee decisions. Careful re-
view of the committee decision by the Board could clearly define any
statutory rights issues. Additionally, the joint committee will be able to
weed out spurious statutory claims.17 2 Before the joint committee will
be of any use to the Board, however, the committees must develop pro-
cedures to record decisions. This would lead to a more complete and
better reasoned consideration of the collective issues and would promote
efficiency as the committee record could be used to present the facts of
the dispute to the Board.
The General Counsel, in a recent interpretation of the Board's
deferral policy, limits deferral to situations where the union has sin-
cerely processed the grievance.1"' This restriction indicates that the
General Counsel has recognized that some union grievance procedures
do not adequately protect the individual employee. It is now up to the
Board to recognize that the Teamster system is such a procedure and
does not merit deferral.
CONCLUSION
In part, the Teamster joint grievance committee system is an ex-
tension of the collective bargaining process. Management and the union
172 See Comment, supra note 12 at 768.
173 Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum GC 84-5, Guideline Memoran-
dum Concerning United Technologies Corp., Daily Labor Report (BNA) (Mar. 19,
1984) at C-8.
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bargain over whether the activity which caused the grievance violated
the contract, thereby institutionalizing the Supreme Court's conception
of grievance and arbitration procedure as "a part of the continuous col-
lective bargaining process. 1"' As such, the system promotes the collec-
tive interests of the union and provides a mechanism through which the
union and management can settle their differences in interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement. In practice, the system does not
protect the individual rights of the employees.
The Board's application of its deferral policy in the Teamster
cases is troublesome for two reasons. First, the Board is failing to ac-
knowledge that the joint grievance system is not truly "arbitration" but
instead is a process where interested parties are making decisions, con-
flicts of interests are apparent, and the fair representation of grievants
is questionable. Second, the committee's expertise, like the arbitrator's,
is in the law of the shop; its function as interpreter of the collective
bargaining agreement does not prepare it to determine the presence or
absence of the discrimination prohibited by the Act. Rather, the Board
is the expert at statutory interpretation.
Before the landmark Collyer decision, Member Jenkins, an out-
spoken critic of excessive Board deferral, noted his dissatisfaction with
the joint committee process. Unfortunately, some fifteen years later, his
concerns are still relevant:
Whatever result such a committee of the protagonists might
reach, it is in part the product of economic power, adjust-
ment with an eye on other disputes or differences between
them or on their future bargaining positions, and other con-
siderations unrelated to the merits of the particular claim
before the Committee.1
7 5
The Board and the courts must realize that the joint committee is
a negotiating instrument, aimed at cementing the collective strength of
the union at the expense of the individual. The fact that the Teamster
process is successful in resolving contractual disputes should not ob-
scure inquiry into its ability to justly adjudicate claims made by indi-
vidual employees.
'", United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581 (1960).
175 Terminal Transp. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 672, 675 (1970).
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